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Peter FlŸgel 
 
In a vast and currently quickly expanding field such as Jaina Studies, which is researched 
by only a small number of scholars, conference volumes covering a wide variety of 
themes are the principal means of academic communication across disciplinary 
boundaries. A welcome addition to the small but growing body of interdisciplinary 
publications in Jaina Studies is the work Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion, edited 
by Piotr Balcerowicz of the University of Warsaw. Specialised in Indian philosophy and 
formal logic, and one of the few experts in Jaina logic in Europe, the editor has done 
more than anyone in recent years in promoting the dialogue between technical philosophy 
and rest of the field of Indic Studies by organising regular international symposia on 
Indian religion and philosophy. The book under review contains proceedings of the 
International Seminar 'Aspects of Jainism' at Warsaw University 8th-9th September 2000, 
supplemented by additional contributions. This important collection of articles in English 
and Sanskrit is addressed at specialists in the field of Jaina Studies. It contains fifteen 
articles by leading scholars in the field, a foreword by Satya Ranjan Banerjee, a 
benedictory message in Sanskrit by Muni Jambūvijaya, a short preface by the editor, and 
an index. The main text is divided into four parts, elegantly labelled 
Caturaranayacakram, four viewpoint-spokes: Philosophy and Anekânta; Early Jainism, 
Buddhism and Ājīvikism; Ethics and Monastic Discipline; Medieval Mysticism and 
Sectarian Divisions.  
The first contribution in the sequence of chapters is, fittingly, Albrecht Wezler's 
article ‘The Twelve Aras of the Dvādaśâra-naya-cakra and their Relation to the Canon 
as Seen by Mallavādin. First Part’, which is the second part of the author's ‘Studien zum 
Dvādaśâra-naya-cakra des Śvetâmbara Mallavādin’, and based on Muni Jambūvijaya's 
critical reconstruction of the (lost) original text on the basis of Kṣamāśramaṇa's 
commentary. In his analysis of the sophisticated structure of the text, and of the 
relationship of Mallavādin's twelve naya (vidhi) scheme to the older seven naya 
(viewpoint) scheme and Siddhasena Divākara's two naya scheme, Wezler comes to the 
conclusion that Frauwallner's interpretation (in his Introduction to Jambūvjiaya's edition 
of the DNC Vol. I) of the 'terms' vidhi ('general affirmation'), niyama ('restriction'), and 
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vidhi-niyama ('affirmation and restriction'), whose combination generates the twelve naya 
structure, is unconvincing: ‘both these modes do not refer to classes of propositions, or 
statements, … but to aspects of, or perspectives of, perceiving (real) objects. The 
“scheme” of the twelve aras of Mallavādin is … basically of an ontological character’ 
(20). According to Mallavādin himself, it is grounded in the teachings of the Jina which 
encompass all other teachings, since ‘The Jaina canon is the true Veda’ (22). 
Jayandra Soni (‘Kundakunda and Umāsvāti on Anekânta-vāda’) compares the 
philosophical terminology used by two of the most influential non-canonical Jaina 
authors, Kundakunda and Umāsvāti, and some of their commentators. He found that 
Kundakunda uses the word ‘syād‘ explicitly, whereas Umāsvāti does not (wisely none of 
the authors in the volume translated syāt, a word that is discussed by J.C. Wright, 
‘Review of: Nagin J. Shah (ed.) Jaina theory of multiple facets of reality and truth 
(Anekāntavāda). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 2000,’ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies 63, 3, 2000: 435-437). Kundakunda uses naya only with reference to the 
'canonical' (pace Balcerowicz, infra, p. 48) distinction between dravya (substance) and 
paryāya (modification), while Umāsvāti refers to the list of five (Digambara: seven) 
nayas (which Kundakunda also mentions). Without explicitly addressing the question of 
the historical evolution of the terminology of Jaina perspectivism, the author concludes 
that it is not clear whether syāt or naya has priority in Kundakunda (28), that the 
Digambara commentator Pūjyapāda (c. 5th-6th C.) first used the word anekânta (33), 
while the approaches of syād-vāda and of anekânta-vāda may or may not be 'implied' in 
the relevant passages of Umāsvāti's Tattvârtha-sūtra (28). 
Through translations and analyses of the relevant explanations of sapta-bhaṅgī in 
the classical treatises on Jaina logic, Piotr Balcerowicz' article ‘Some Remarks on the 
Naya Method’ demonstrates that the well-known scheme of the 'sevenfold modal 
description' (sapta-bhaṅgī) can be interpreted as an answer to the question 'how to relate 
the whole and its parts' (40), if the whole is to be understood as a multiplex reality, which 
can only be fully described through statements from different perspectives ('contexts'). 
The analysis shows convincingly that the (Digambara) Jaina scheme is arranged in form 
of a 'progressive indexation' of the semantic field of a statement, in which each viewpoint 
(naya) delimits the context further (46): ‘What is conspicuous in this method of 
description by way of applying seven conditionally valid predications in the gradual 
limitation of the context: from the most general one …down to the most specialised. … 
Thus every subsequent viewpoint is directly related to the one preceding it and it 
represents a further restriction of the point of reference' (61). Thus, it is not necessary to 
assume, as critics do, that the scheme violates the law of non-contradiction, or to take 
recourse to multi-valued logic (Pandey). In footnotes, the article proposes solutions to a 
number of longstanding problems in the field of Jaina logic. In footnote 27, it is argued 
that Kundakunda's two-truth theory goes back to the Buddhist Kathā-vatthu and Milinda-
pañha (47). A small question mark may be put over the proposed formalisation of the 
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method sevenfold predication in terms of 'truth-values', since at least Siddharṣigaṇi points 
out the significance of the speaker's intention, which however cannot be taken into 
account in the objectivist description of the 'co-ordinates' of the 'paradigm index' of 
sapta-bhaṅgī (63). A further extension of the important findings of this study in view of 
current work on speech act analysis would be fascinating.     
Christoph Emmerich, in ‘How Many Times? Pluralism, Dualism or Monism in 
Early Jaina Temporal Description’, implicitly suggests a three-stage evolution of 
systematic ontological conceptions of time in Jainism (71). He starts with the classical 
conceptions of Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, who both defined time as a substance 
(dravya). Umāsvāti distinguished between niścaya-kāla (dravya-kāla) (absolute time, 
beyond measurement, samaya) and vyavahāra-kāla (conventional time, measured 
through spatial movement); kāla being defined primarily as setting in motion (vartanā), 
change (pariṇāma), or motion (kriyā). Kundakunda, on the other hand, was only 
concerned with absolute time. He adopted an atomistic conception of time-atoms 
(samaya) in analogy to the apparently pre-existing conception of space-atoms (pradeśa). 
This conception remained dominant in the Digambara tradition, while the Śvetāmbaras 
favoured an integral notion of time. Earlier, less systematic, texts such as Viy 207b 
distinguish cosmographic regions where time can be measured (samaya kṣetra) from 
those beyond where it cannot (due to the absence of planets). The author suggests that the 
main step towards the development of ontological concepts of time 'as such' must have 
been the interpretation of these two regions with the help of the niścaya/vyavahāra 
distinction (76, 78). As Adelheid Mette already showed (84), the word kāla is rarely used 
in canonical texts which instead use the word addhā-samaya (Viy 11.11, 25.5), translated 
by the author not as 'abstract time' (Deleu)(78), but as 'a stretch of time' or 'the time 
dimension' of past, present and future in view of the 'enumerative' character of addhā 
(80). In the canon, neither addhā-samaya nor kāla is characterised as a substance 
(dravya) - a conception which may have emerged as the result of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya 
influence - nor is the niścaya/vyavahāra distinction explicitly applied to descriptions of 
time (80). In the oldest texts, the 'seniors', which are predominantly soteriological in 
orientation, even the word samaya in its temporal sense is not used. Instead, the word 
khaa, short duration, is employed to designate a ‘certain time' of significance (82-4).    
In her thematic study ‘Extrasensory Perception and Knowledge in Jainism’ 
Kristi L. Wiley investigates the classification and role of extrasensory perception in a 
variety of Jaina texts. Particularly interesting is the discussion of different views within 
the Jaina tradition on the sequentiality/simultaneity of darśana and jñāna, and of avadhi- 
jñāna (clairvoyance) and manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna (mind-reading), and the attribution of 
these powers to different stages of the guṇa-sthāna scheme. Interestingly, the author 
found few details on what exactly was perceived through mind reading (which is said not 
to be possible anymore in our era) (103). But the texts univocally state that 'attachment to 
these powers is detrimental to a mendicant's continued spiritual progress' (106). 
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Muni Jambūvijaya's short and rather general contribution ‘Jainadarśanasya 
Svarūpamuddeśaśca [The Essence and Outline of Jainism]’ is written in Sanskrit, and 
was probably only included in recognition of his pre-eminent status as a scholar-saint.  
Three articles concentrate on Jaina-related passages in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta 
in the Buddhist Dīgha-nikāya. Padmanabh S. Jaini (‘Cātuyāma-saṁvara in the Pāli 
Canon’) addresses the open question of the meaning of the fourth of the ‘four restraints’ 
(cāujjāma dhamma) in early Jainism, which is not clearly defined in the well-known 
sources in the Jaina and Buddhist (DN I. 57) sources. The only available characterisation 
is the obscure compound bahiddhâdāṇa in Than 4.266, translated by the commentator 
Abhayadeva as (restraint of) 'sexual conduct and other possessions'. Jaini identifies two 
sūtras in the Pāli canon, which confirm this interpretation. In DN 3.48f., the fourth of the 
cāturyāma saṁvara is described with the word bhāvitaṃ ('the pleasures of senses'). In the 
passage itself the Niganthas are not mentioned, but the commentator Buddhaghosa 
clearly attributes the fourfold restraint to the 'Titthiyas', or Jainas. Since at least 
Dhammapāla must have met Jaina mendicants in the 6th century in South India, and 
because the five great vows (pañca-mahā-vrata) of the Jainas are nowhere mentioned in 
the Buddhist commentary literature of the period, Jaini concludes with the evocative 
hypothesis that 'Buddhists in South India most probably were in contact with some Jaina 
mendicants who may still have been observing the cāturyāma saṁvara' (133). The author 
was apparently not aware of Adelheid Mette's earlier discussion of DN 3.48f. (‘The 
Synchronism of the Buddha and the Jina Mahāvīra and the Problem of Chronology in 
Early Jainism’, in H. Bechert (ed.) 1991. The Dating of the Historical Buddha. Part 1, 
132-7. Gšttigen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht). 
Kenji Watanabe's ‘A Comparative Study of Passages from Early Buddhist and 
Jaina Texts: Āyār 2.15 : Dhp 183 and Isioh 29.19 : Dhp 360, 361’ is based on a number 
of papers published in Japanese between 1981-1994 and points to 'some parallelism 
between the Buddhist kusala and the samāyika [sāmāyika] -cāritra in Jainism' (141), i.e. 
the vow to abstain from all sinful acts, because both refer to the stopping of the influx of 
karma. Similar parallelisms are found with regard to saṁvara and vāri in passages also 
discussed by Jaini (146). 
The formidable article by Johannes Bronkhorst, ‘Ājīvika Doctrine Reconsidered’, 
proposes a new solution to the conundrum of what exactly the Ājīvikas taught, which was 
left unsolved in Hoernle’s contributions (curiously not mentioned by Bronkhorst) and in 
Basham's exegeses of the opaque passages describing Gosāla's teachings in the Buddhist 
(DN 1.53f.) and Jaina (Viy 15) scriptures. Bronkhorst’s interpretation is predicated on his 
well-publicised view that early Jainas were mostly concerned with immobility, i.e. with 
stopping all physical and mental activity, whereas early Buddhists highlighted the role of 
desire and intention (157): 'The inactivity of the Jain ascetic was not only meant to avoid 
producing karmic effects in the future, but also to destroy actions carried out in the past. 
The Ājīvika denied that present inactivity can destroy actions carried out in the past. For 
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him these former actions will carry fruit whatever one does. However, there is no reason 
to believe that he rejected the possibility of non-performance of new actions' (163). 
However, this does not answer why the Ājīvikas propagated a strict determinism. 
Bronkhorst’s answer focuses on the less well understood passage in the DN (1.53f.): 
‘There is no deed performed either by oneself or by others, no human action, no strength, 
no courage, no human endurance or human prowess (paraphrase Basham)’. In his view, 
the Ājīvikas must have believed, like the proponents of the Sāṁkhya school and of the 
Bhagavad-gītā, that ‘the real self does not act’, and that activity belongs to the material 
world (169). What exactly distinguished the Ājīvika position from the message of the 
Bhagavad-gītā, Bronkhorst fails to explain, apart from the suggestion that it may have 
rejected the caste-orientation of the Bhagavad-gītā in favour of the idea that everyone has 
its own predetermined trajectory of reincarnations (ibid.). At the end of his article 
Bronkhorst speculates that early Jainism may have had a similar conception of an 
inactive (akiriyā) self, which is not in evidence in the later Jaina literature anymore. The 
conception of an active (kiriyā) soul, as seemingly manifest in the oldest surviving Jaina 
text (Āyāra 1.1.1.3-5), would, of course, seriously undermine the ‘immobility’ thesis 
(therefore his defence in note 47, pace Schubring 1935: ¤ 57, 70), which also does not 
match the prescribed Jaina practices of begging and wandering, the unavoidable violence 
of which was criticised precisely by the Ājīvikas (cf. Viy.). However, Bronkhorst’s 
convincing reconstruction of the Ājīvika doctrine would not even be affected by the 
removal of the immobility thesis.  
Phyllis Granoff’s ‘Paradigms of Protection in Early Indian Religious Texts or an 
Essay on What to Do with Your Demons’ argues that basically three different strategies 
of dealing with the demons attacking children with disease can be identified in South 
Asian religious and medical literature: First, the strategy of either 'chasing evil away' or 
propitiating 'the agent of evil with a sacrificial offering', or both (185), that can be found 
in the Ṛg-Veda and the Brāhmaṇas, or the aggressive subduing of the aggressor, for 
instance by Kṛṣṇa, the protector, in the Hari-vaṁśa; second, the Buddhist strategy of 
converting the aggressor into a protector of the home, as manifest in the Mūla-sarvāsti-
vāda-vinaya; and, third, the Jaina strategy of attributing all harm to karmic rather than 
supernatural causes, and to remain indifferent to demonic forces, as evidenced by 
selected stories of the Āvaśyaka literature. The article offers numerous new and evocative 
hypotheses (e.g., because protective functions were not attributed to the Buddha, local 
deities were incorporated as protectors of Buddhist communities (200)), which could be 
fruitfully related to comparisons of a similar kind by anthropologists such as L.A. Babb, 
and his predecessors.  
Adelheid Mette's ‘Waste Disposal (pariṭṭhavaṇa-vihi) in Ancient India. Some 
Regulations for Protection of Life from the Rules of the Order of Jain Monks’ (a 
translation of the German original to be published in a forthcoming volume) can be read 
as an addition to her magisterial work on the Piṇḍ'esaṇā, the chapter of the Ogha Niryukti 
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on the alms round of the Jaina 'monks'. The Pāriṣṭhāpanikī-niryukti is a short Prakrit text 
of 83 āryā stanzas compiled from various sources, embedded within the Āvaśyaka 
Niryukti. The text is a commentary to the 5th samiti, or rule of circumspection, concerning 
the proper removal of impure substances (Skt. pāriṣṭhāpanikī). It has a parallel in Ogha 
Niryukti 596-625, which is generally less complete, but more elaborate with regard to the 
correct disposal of human excreta (215, 223). Mette's article analyses the flaws in the 
structure of the text, and offers translations and analyses of 'assorted excerpts'. It 
concludes with the remark that 'not the arbitrary rule of the cleric superior, but ahiṁsā, 
the principle of conscientious non-injury of life, provides the criterion' which informed 
the formulation of specified rules: 'the quite simple forms of external living conditions 
forced the adoption of a detail-oriented order and strict regulations of behaviour' (223f.).  
On the basis of four examples selected from the medieval Digambara narrative 
literature, Luitgard Soni, in ‘Concealing and Protecting: Stories on Upagūhana’, explores 
the puzzling concept of upagūhana or avagūhana (Pkt. uvagūhaṇa) - protecting Jainism 
by concealing the faults of one's fellow members – which is regarded as one of the eight 
attributes of right belief (samyag-darśana) of a lay-person (cf. R. Williams. Jaina Yoga. 
London, 1963, pp. 43-5). The paradox that in such cases the 'protection of the true 
religion is based on an explicit lie' in direct contradiction to the Jaina value of 
truthfulness (229) is explained with reference to the idea of a higher 'duty' manifest in the 
examples which show that 'upagūhana is not implemented for the sake of an individual 
but for the status of the Jaina community as a whole' (235). 
In ‘A Portrait of the Yogi (joi) as Sketched by Joindu’ Colette Caillat explains, 
through a philological examination of his terminology, why for the Digambara mystic 
Yogindu (Pkt. Joindu) (c. 6-10 C. C.E.) 'most of the exercises that are commonly termed 
yoga, joya are spurious', or, at best, mere preparations for the ultimate form of Jaina 
yoga, the 'contemplation of the supreme self (paramâtma)' (244). Interestingly, the word 
yoga itself is not used in Yogindu's main poems – the Yoga-sara and the Paramâtma-
prakāśa - which prefer the verb joi (Skt. yogin), often in association with words derived 
from the present jāṇai (Skt. jānāti), 'he knows' (247). In continuation of her longstanding 
criticism of the common misrepresentation of Jainism as a religion that is only concerned 
with the regulation of outward (and mental) action, Caillat shows convincingly that the 
association of Jaina yoga with vision and knowledge is fundamental in Digambara 
mysticism, and that self-contemplation is regarded as the form of 'right conduct' of those 
who know (248): 'Joindu even maintains, paradoxically, that right doing, from the 
transcendental point of view, is worse than wrong doing' because it produces pleasurable 
rewards and encourages more of the same karma-accumulating actions (250).  
Nalini Balbir's stimulating contribution ‘Samayasundara's Sāmācārī-śataka and 
Jaina Sectarian Divisions in the Seventeenth Century’ is part of a project on the 'history 
of ideas and methods of argumentation' in Jainism (254). It illustrates the methods 
employed by the Jaina praśnottara ('questions and answers) literature, which emerged in 
 6
the medieval period during a phase of intense sectarian competition (a chronology of 
selected texts from the 14th century onward is given on p. 274, though Klatt 1894: 175 
cites an earlier text composed in 1206). According to Balbir, the genre is characterised by 
a 'tendency to stress divergences' (256) in doctrine and practice (259), although the 
criticised groups are rarely explicitly mentioned (257). Most praśnottara texts do not 
follow any organising principles (257). They focus on ascetic practice and liturgy, which 
'is one of the areas at the heart of differentiation between Jain orders' (261). The 
technique of 'source-quotations' is widely used to establish legitimacy for partisan 
interpretations (263). The 17th century Sāmācārī-śataka of the Kharatara-gaccha 
upādhyāya Samayasundara is particularly rich in captivating detail. Following the 
example of Klatt's (1894) study, the text is summarised in the form of keywords. The 
article concentrates then on selected doctrinal innovations of the Kharatara-gaccha vis à 
vis other sects. The key example is Samayasundara’s interpretation of the legendary 
'embryo transfer' of Mahāvīra as the ‘sixth kalyāṇaka’, or auspicious event, in his life, 
which contrasts with the conventional ‘five auspicious events’ in the lives of the other 
Jinas (263-7). Balbir concludes from this (pace P. Dundas) that Samayasundara does not 
write as a 'puritan' fundamentalist but as an innovator who seems to prioritise the 
imperatives of group identity over those of the canonical tradition (267). His technique of 
citing canonical scriptures (sūtra, siddhânta) and authors belonging to his tradition 
(sampradāya) side by side represents 'a subtle way to introduce novelties without calling 
them so' (268). The main argument of the article concerns the interpretation of the 
changes within the tradition by Jaina authors themselves, whose arguments Balbir often, 
with very good reasons, deconstructs: ‘The prevalent tendency is to see changes 
occurring in one's own group as restorations, and changes made by others as lapses’ 
(273). It could have been added here, that innovations are detectable in the canon itself; 
and that the scriptures explicitly permit the ācāryas to frame new rules under certain 
circumstances. In fact, the rhetorical techniques of the medieval authors do not seem to 
be much different from those of the compilers of the ‘canon’ itself. The presumed 
'invention' of the practice of 'installing images or stūpas of the gurus' may also not be a 
'distinctly characteristic of the Kharatara-gaccha' (269), since stūpas are already 
mentioned in the scriptures. In an interesting footnote, Balbir herself points to citations of 
older sources in the Sena-praśna, a later praśnottara text of Śubhavijayagai, which 
support this conclusion.  
John E. Cort's short article ‘Dyānatrāy: An Eighteenth Century Digambara 
Mystical Poet’ is a revised and expanded version of an article which was first issued in 
the largely inaccessible publication Mahāvīr Jayantī Smārikā 37 (2000). It offers a 
translation of selected poems of Dyānatrāya's oeuvre, and locates four influences on the 
work of this author, who belonged to the Adhyātma lay movement: Digambara 
mysticism, Digambara liturgy, Jaina devotional poetry, and the Hindi poetry of the 
nirguṇ sants.  
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This outstanding collection of original and thought provoking philological and 
historical essays makes a significant contribution to Jaina Studies. It is a must read for 
everyone with an interest in the academic study of the Jaina tradition.  
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